When users run a group key exchange (GKE) protocol, they usually extract the key from some auxiliary (ephemeral) secret information generated during the execution. Strong corruptions are attacks by which an adversary can reveal these ephemeral secrets, in addition to the possibly used long-lived keys. Undoubtedly, security impact of strong corruptions is serious, and thus specifying appropriate security requirements and designing secure GKE protocols appears an interesting yet challenging task -the aim of our paper.
INTRODUCTION
A group key exchange (GKE) protocol provides participants with a common secret group key. The main (semantic) security requirement called Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) [8, 9] aims to ensure that the established key is indistinguishable from a random one by any outsider adversary. The second requirement called Mutual Authentication (MA) [8] aims to ensure that all legitimate protocol participants and only them have actually computed identical session group keys. These security requirements have been extensively studied in the literature (see the recent survey in [27] ). However in the most basic scenarios, all users are somehow protected, that is, the adversary has no control over them, and is restricted to attacks carried out through the network (which nevertheless include impersonation attacks where the adversary talks on the network by pretending being a legitimate user).
In order to take into account real-life threats on users, the notion of forward secrecy is usually considered. Forward secrecy means that the established session key remains secure "in the future", that is, remains indistinguishable from random even if the adversary corrupts a long-lived key in the future. The notion is motivated by the fact that, by nature, long-lived keys get more chance to be leaked to an attacker than ephemeral secrets.
The next known kind of corruptions, referred to as strong corruptions in [9, 31, 33] provides the adversary with even more information. Namely, the adversary gets the user's ephemeral secrets in addition to the long-lived keys. But, he is not allowed to get the established session group key. In [31] , Shoup explains why such a separation makes sense: session keys are typically controlled by higher-level applications that will use them, while internal, ephemeral secrets are specific to the group key exchange protocol execution and could be erased once this protocol is finished.
Actually, it seems impossible to obtain security when ephemeral secrets are revealed: if the adversary (even "passively") can learn all intermediate key material, then he will likely be able to compute the final key. However, such scenario becomes much more interesting for dynamic groups: in many cases, ephemeral secrets of a particular session are subsequently re-used (in addition to some refreshed data) when the group key is updated. Then, it is important to ask how the knowledge of ephemeral secrets in a corrupted session impacts the security of other sessions (past and future). This is precisely where the notion of strong forward/backward secrecy raises up.
At this point, we emphasize that the kind of corruptions considered in this paper is slightly different than those encountered in general multi-party cryptographic protocols. The corruptions we are studying here are adaptive (opposed to static) in the sense that the adversary chooses which users to corrupt based on the information he gained so far and in any stage of the protocol execution. On the other hand, the corruption mode is passive rather than active, because the adversary can only "read" secrets held by the attacked user (whatever these secrets are ephemeral or long-lived): in no case he gets control on the user's behavior. However, through the knowledge of the long-lived key he can (typically) inject signed messages on behalf of the user while preventing the original user's messages from being delivered. In fact, this allows an active participation of the adversary during the protocol execution, and thus we say the adversary is active; but this refers to his ability to control the network, not the user's behavior.
In order to further refine the security definitions, our intention is to separate the long-lived key from the ephemeral secrets and to specify when the adversary can learn them. Through this separation we explicitly allow the adversary to reveal ephemeral secrets without revealing the long-lived key; we call this opening attacks. They are the balanced complement of weak corruption attacks, where long-lived keys are revealed, but ephemeral secrets are not. We note that under opening attacks, there is hope to prevent the adversary from actively participating in the protocol on behalf of the opened parties since he does not receive the long-lived keys. Finally, we notice that the strong corruption model in its current form is the best (or worst) of two worlds: if the adversary corrupts then it obtains the long-lived keys and the ephemeral data, if it does not corrupt then it obtains nothing. But separating the attacks in two distinct modes allows to refine and opt for stronger security definitions.
The AKE requirement is usually defined from the perspective of some (fresh) session, and thus makes sense only if the adversary is restricted to neither participate on behalf of an user nor to obtain any ephemeral secret in that session. On the other hand, the MA requirement remains meaningful even without such limitations. Even if achieving MA without AKE is of low interest for key exchange protocols, it is still legitimate to ask whether achieving MA under strong corruptions during the attacked session is possible. This especially, since the MA requirement still makes sense in the presence of malicious participants/insiders (users whose long-lived keys are known to the adversary).
We emphasize that this setting of strong corruptions differs from the one considered in general multi-party protocols. In multi-party computation scenario, malicious participants are the adversary: their behavior is by definition under adversary's control, and the adversary's goal is to gain information about honest users' internal state. While our setting is complementary: the adversary has (via queries) information about the long-lived keys of some users who it can impersonate; additionally, it can have information about the internal states of some other users without being able to impersonate them (such users are called honest); the goal of the adversary is then to influence the behavior of at least one honest user whom it cannot impersonate.
Furthermore, consideration of malicious insiders in multiple sessions raises attacks related to key control and contributiveness: for instance, think of a participant who can force the same key to be obtained twice (key-replication [25] ) and used in two distinct applications. Here we recall that the question on who controls the value of the group key states the important difference between group key exchange and group key transport protocols (in which a trusted party chooses the key on behalf of participants) [12] . In GKE protocols it is essential that the key is computed from inputs (contributions) of all participants such that even a strict subset of (malicious) insiders cannot influence the resulting value of the group key. Especially, when considering malicious insiders that can choose own contributions arbitrarily and may additionally reveal internal states of honest participants at any stage of the protocol execution through opening attacks, preventing key control and ensuring contributiveness for the honest users appears to be a challenging task.
Related Work

Original Definitions
The definitions of AKE-and MA-security (without strong corruptions and only for honest users) were originally given by Bresson et al. [11] (see [19, 21, 22] for further variants, and [13] for some flaws). In [9] , Bresson et al. modeled strong corruptions, but for AKE-security only, following the ideas of Shoup [31] , and Canetti and Krawczyk [15] for twoparty protocols, for which such strong AKE-security has been recently modeled in LaMacchia et al. [26] .
Katz and Shin in 2005 extended the definition of MAsecurity [20] by assuming misbehaving (malicious) protocol participants; and they provided a concrete generic solution (compiler) to prevent these attacks, however, without considering opening attacks against ephemeral secrets as well as key control and contributiveness. The significance of security against malicious participants was also recognized by Choo et al. [16] through unknown-key share attacks, by which an active adversary tries to make an honest protocol participant believe that the group key is shared with one party when it is in fact shared with another party.
On Key Control and Contributiveness
Mitchel et al. [29] (see also Boyd and Mathuria [6] ) gave informal definition of key control, to describe attacks where participants try to influence the resulting value of the key. Yet informally, Ateniese et al. [2] proposed the notion of contributiveness meaning that all participants must equally contribute to the computation of the key and guarantee its freshness (see [33] ); these definitions emphasize the difference between key distribution and key exchange [28] . Following these requirements Bresson and Catalano [7] have considered the (weaker) case where participants are honest but have biased source of randomness so that an adversary can possibly gain extra information about the key. Deepening this, Bohli et al. [4] gave definitions of key control and contributiveness considering a (stronger) case where participants deliberately wish to influence the resulting value of the group key. Still, their definitions are based on the model from [11] , and, thus, do not consider strong corruptions. Finally, Krawczyk mentioned in [25] that a key exchange protocol should prevent key-replication attacks whose goal is to influence the acceptance of the same key in different protocol sessions. Independent of our work, Desmedt et al. [18] considered a property of non-malleability for GKE protocols, which is close to key control and contributiveness. Their security goal, called shielded-insider privacy, aims to prevent attacks where an outsider adversary upon communication with some malicious participants prior to the protocol execution, obtains information about the later computed group key. In order to ensure shielded-insider privacy they use Pedersen's commitments [30] ; however in case of strong corruptions committed secrets can still be revealed to the adversary (due to opening attacks), so that malicious participants would still be able to bias the computation. In our model we do not consider this scenario explicitly, but focus on the (in)ability of the adversary representing malicious participants to predict the resulting value of the later established group key.
Recently, Manulis [27] analyzed several existing models for GKE protocols with respect to considering strong corruptions: he pointed out that security against strong corruptions is currently considered in a rather restrictive way: only for strong forward secrecy of AKE-security. Moreover, none of the available game-based security models is complete enough to unify the most important definitions of AKE-, MA-security, and key control and contributiveness.
Contributions and Organization
In this paper we solve most of the problems put in light above by revisiting the security model for GKE protocols from the perspective of strong corruptions and designing a provably secure GKE protocol that resists these attacks.
Security Model and Stronger Definitions
As our first contribution in Section 2 we provide the following:
• we model a powerful adversary who is given access to strong corruptions, by describing an appropriate gamebased security model for GKE protocols, thus extending the ideas from Bresson et al. [9] , in particular towards strong AKE-security;
• in our definition of strong MA-security we take into account the adversary that participates on behalf of corrupted users during the attacked session and reveals the ephemeral secrets of all other (honest) users; due to opening attacks our definition is stronger than the related one given in [20] ;
• we formalize strong contributiveness as security against attacks aiming to enforce a value chosen by a powerful adversary as a group key (e.g. key-replication attacks [25] ); since the adversary can corrupt and, thus, impersonate users, and additionally open all other honest users our requirement is stronger than the one in [4] .
GKE Protocol with Strong Security
As a second contribution in Section 3, we describe a 3-round GKE protocol, named TDH1, and prove that it provides strong versions of AKE-, MA-security and contributiveness, while the deployed techniques can be seen as general for many GKE protocols. TDH1 tolerates the following numbers of malicious insiders (out of n participants): for MA-security up to n − 2, for contributiveness up to n − 1, whereby all remaining honest users might be opened! Our security proofs do not rely on the Random Oracle Model [3] . The AKE-security of TDH1 is based on the Tree Decisional Diffie-Hellman (TDDH) assumption, introduced by Kim et al. in [23, 24] . We give a formal definition of the underlying TDDH problem and show its polynomial equivalence to the standard Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [5] by a proof which addresses arbitrary full binary trees, i.e., trees where each node has exactly zero or two leaves (note, Kim et al. addressed only a subset, i.e., linear and complete trees).
EXECUTION MODEL AND STRONG SECURITY DEFINITIONS FOR GKE
We start by (re)stating existing definitions and classical notations using the game-based approach. Note that another way (which we do not consider here) to define security requirements is to use the simulation-based approach, e.g. [20] (but see Remark 1). which is composed of all ephemeral secret information used during the protocol execution. The long-lived key LLU is, in nature, excluded from it (moreover the long-lived key is specific to the user, not to the oracle). An oracle Π s U is unused until initialization (by which it is given the long-lived key LLU ). It then becomes a group member, associated to a particular session, and turns into the stand-by state where it waits for an invocation to execute the protocol. When the protocol starts, the oracle learns its partner id pid 
Protocol Execution and Participants
Session Group Key, Session and Partner IDs, Group Members
Every session is identified by a unique, publicly-known session id sid . Sometimes we simply write G to denote the group of oracles participating in the same protocol session. Then each oracle in G is called a group member. Note that oracles in G may be ordered, e.g., lexicographically based on the user identities. Definition 1. A GKE protocol P consists of a key generation algorithm KeyGen, and a protocol Setup:
On input a security parameter 1 κ each user in U is provided with a long-lived key LLU .
P.Setup(S):
On input a set S of n unused oracles a new group G is created and set to be S. A probabilistic interactive protocol is executed between the oracles in G such that all oracles accept with the session group key and terminate.
A protocol is said to be correct if, when no adversary is present, all participants compute the same key. Note that our definition is independent of the communication channel, e.g., (asymmetric) broadcast, multicast, or unicast.
Strong Adversarial Model
Now we consider an adversary A which is a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) algorithm having complete control over the network. A can interact with protocol participants via queries to their oracles. Note that our security model (similar to [4, 9, 20] ) does not deal with the issues of denialof-service and fault-tolerance; our security definitions aim to prevent honest participants from accepting the group key biased by malicious insiders.
Queries to the Instance Oracles
Execute(S):
A eavesdrops an honest execution of P.Setup between a chosen set of oracles and is given the resulting transcript of P.Setup(S). 
Send(Π
Remark 1. Note that natural separation of the queries
RevealState and Corrupt explicitly provides the possibility for the opening attacks mentioned in the introduction. By asking the RevealState query to an instance oracle Π s U the adversary reads out its ephemeral secrets but cannot impersonate U in the protocol execution, unless a Corrupt(U ) query is asked (in which case all instance oracles Π s U become malicious insiders through possible impersonation actions of A). Thus, just opening a user does not make him malicious. In contrast, simulation-based security models (e.g. Universal Composability / Reactive Simulatability) handle strong corruptions typically as follows: upon corrupting a user the adversary learns all information known to that user and controls him thereafter. Obviously, in the simulation-based models opening attacks (which strengthen the adversary) are currently not modeled. From this perspective, our adversarial setting appears to be stronger than the simulation-based one focusing on similar security goals.
Strong AKE-Security
In case of strong AKE-security one must also consider the knowledge of the adversary about long-lived keys and ephemeral secrets of session participants. If the adversary obtains a long-lived key before the session is started then it can impersonate a user, and thus, learn the session key. And if the adversary is allowed to obtain long-lived keys before the session is finished then it should be restricted from actively using these keys during that time [21] .
On the other hand, the adversary should be allowed to reveal ephemeral secrets of participants before the session starts 1 and after the session is finished. Note that, if one allows long-lived key corruptions in later sessions, revealing ephemeral secrets during the attacked session wouldn't make sense. In order to model the described requirements for the adversarial knowledge we define the notion of oracle freshness, extending those given in [9, 21] by the condition that allows opening attacks in the previous and later sessions. We say that a session is fresh if all participating oracles are fresh.
We note that the above definition ensures that if at least one oracle participating in a session is fresh then the whole session is fresh too because freshness of one oracle requires freshness of all its partners. This notion of oracle freshness simplifies the following definition of strong AKE-security for GKE protocols.
Definition 3. (Strong AKE-Security)
Let P be a correct GKE protocol and b a uniformly chosen bit. Consider an adversary A against the AKE-security of P. We define the adversarial game Game ake−b A,P (κ) as follows:
• after initialization, A interacts with instance oracles via queries;
• at some point A asks a Test query to a fresh oracle Π s U which has accepted; • A continues interacting with instance oracles;
1 A GKE protocol may use auxiliary secrets pre-computed offline in order to achieve better performance during the communication phase. Such protocols are not strong AKEsecure since the adversary can break into the internal states prior to the protocol execution.
• when A terminates, it outputs a bit, which we define to be the output of the game.
We define: Adv
and denote with Adv ake P (κ) the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries A. We say that a GKE protocol P provides strong AKE-security if this advantage is negligible.
We again stress that (strong) AKE-security makes sense for adversaries that are not able to corrupt users and act on their behalf during the attacked session or reveal any ephemeral secrets used in that session -this is guaranteed by the freshness property.
Strong MA-Security
We say that Π The maximum probability of this event is denoted Succ ma P (κ); we say that a GKE protocol P provides strong MA-security if this probability is negligible.
Strong Contributiveness
In the following we propose a definition which unifies the requirements of key control, contributiveness and unpredictability of group keys, taking into account malicious insiders. Informally, we consider an active adversary A which can both corrupt and open participants at any stage of the protocol execution in such a way that there exists at least one honest oracle (which may nevertheless be opened!) that accepts the session group key chosen by the adversary. In particular, our definition prevents malicious insiders from enforcing honest participants to accept a group key used in some previous session (key-replication attacks [25] , see also Remark 2).
Definition 5. (Strong Contributiveness)
Let P be a correct GKE protocol and A an adversary operating in two stages (prepare and attack) and having access to the queries Send, Execute, RevealKey, RevealState, and Corrupt. We define the following game Game • A(prepare) outputsk ∈ {0, 1} κ , and some state information ζ;
• the following sets are built: G us consisting of all honest used oracles, Gstd consisting of all honest oracles that are in the stand-by state 2 , and Ψ consisting of session ids sid We define: Succ Note also that U must be honest but A is allowed to reveal the internal state of Π s U during the execution of the attack stage (this is because our model separates LLU from state s U ). The goal of the adversary is to influence the honest participants to accept the chosen key. Our game appears stronger than [4] since the adversary can open honest users' internal state (furthermore he can make corruptions in an adaptive manner).
Remark 2.
The main difference to the non-malleability definition from [18] is that we allow A to open honest users during the attacked session, however, at the cost that we do not deal with the ability of A to bias the probability distribution of the resulting group key (similar to [4] ). It seems to be hard to achieve this goal if A corrupts n − 1 users and opens the last n-th honest user, which is allowed by our definition. At least, the commitment techniques used in [18] would not help since committed secrets can be revealed.
TREE DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL WITH STRONG SECURITY
In this section we present our constant-round GKE protocol denoted TDH1 and show that it satisfies the strong versions of AKE-, MA-security, and contributiveness. Its AKEsecurity relies on the Tree Decisional Diffie-Hellman (TDDH) assumption, introduced by Kim et al. in [23, 24] .
Number-Theoretic Assumptions
First, we formally specify the TDDH assumption and quantify the reduction to the classical Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [5] . Our protocol and those (unauthenticated) in [23, 24] require a special multiplicative group G in which DDH is assumed to be hard and for which there exists an efficient bijection 3 from G to Z |G| . Thus, not every DDHhard group can be used, e.g., no such bijection is known for elliptic curves.
Algebraic Group
Let p be a safe prime, i.e., p = 2q +1, with q a κ-bit prime. The set of quadratic residue modulo p is a cyclic groupĜ of order q; let g be a generator:Ĝ = g . Consider the following mapping u :
Zq to G is a bijection, and that the operation (a, b) ∈ G 2 → u(ab mod p) is a group law on G. Since G = Z q (as sets), we can define the exponentiation a b := u(a b mod p) for all a, b ∈ G. Also, due to the fact that f is a bijection, we have f (x) is random, uniform in G as soon as x is so.
Finally, it is believed [5] that the DDH assumption holds in G, that is, the distributions of (g
Tree Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let T n be the set of all full 4 binary trees with n leaves. For a T n ∈ T n of depth d Tn , each node is identified via a label l, v , where l ∈ [0, d Tn ] is the level of the node and v its position within this level: the position is such that the child nodes of l, v (if present) are labeled l + 1, 2v and l + 1, 2v + 1 (this implies that the nodes positions are in [0, 2 l − 1], but may be not contiguous). The root node is labeled 0, 0 . In the following we will denote T n \ 0, 0 by T * n . The set of leaf nodes and the set of internal nodes of Tn are defined as (respectively): 3 The exponentiation x → g x is a bijection from Z |G| to G. We require that there exists an efficiently computable (bijective) mapping in the opposite direction, but we do NOT require this mapping to be the discrete logarithm! 4 A binary tree is called full if each of its nodes has exactly 0 or 2 children. Sometimes such trees are also called proper.
For a set X of n randomly chosen variables x l,v ∈ R G, with l, v ∈ LN Tn , we (recursively) define for each l, v ∈ INT n :
, and
Additionally, for a randomly chosen r ∈ R G, we define the tuples TDDH T n (X) and TDDH $ T n (X) as follows:
TDDH Tn (X) = TDHT n (X) ∪ 0, 0 , g x 1,0 x 1,1 , and
The TDDH assumption states that the respective distributions of these tuples induced by uniform choices of r and the x l,v , for l, v ∈ LNT n are computationally indistinguishable.
Definition 6. (TDDH Assumption)
For all n > 1, any Tn ∈ T n , any group G, and any PPT algorithm A, the distinguishing advantage Adv TDDH T n ,G (A), defined as follows, is negligible (in κ = log |G|):
Theorem 1 (DDH ⇐⇒ TDDH). The TDDH problem in G is polynomially equivalent to the DDH problem in Z q , and we have:
The proof appears in Appendix A and is more general than those in [23, 24] that focus only on complete and linear binary trees. For n = 2 (i.e., X = {x 1 , x 2 }) we get the classical DDH assumption in G with the advantage Adv 
Light Description of TDH1
The main mechanism of the protocol is that of [23, 24] , so we first recall it. The differences will be in message authentication, key derivation, and applied erasure technique to prevent the ephemeral session secrets from being leaked once the session is finished.
The Setup Operation
Every oracle is assigned to a leaf node of a so-called linear binary tree T n : a full binary tree with one leaf at each level, except for the deepest one with two leaves (see Figure 1) . In other words T *
Round 2 -First player. Π 1 at position n − 1, 0 is able to build a set X 1 of secret values for each node x l,0 in its path up to the root 0, 0 . This is because for each internal node x l,0 = (y l+1,1 )
x l+1,0 Then, Π s 1 computes the setŶ consisting of y l,0 := g x l,0 for each previously computed internal node's secret value x l,0 except for x 0,0 , and broadcastsŶ .
Round 3 -No communication. Upon receivingŶ , all other oracles Π i =1 are able to compute their own set Xi consisting of all secret values x l,v in their paths up to the root. Hence, every oracle finally learns x 0,0 . We emphasize that x 0,0 is never exposed, and that there is no y 0,0 in the protocol (see description of function TDH1 Exp (l, X) below).
Group Key Confirmation and Derivation
To derive the session group key K, each participant iteratively computes a sequence of values ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n using a pseudo-random function (PRF) f with a public value v0 as input. The key (secret seed) of f is initially set to x 0,0 , and is changed in each invocation of f by embedding successive nonces using an appropriate one-way permutation π. These nonces are provided by participants during the protocol execution.
Intuitively, these successive evaluations of f and π prevent malicious participants from influencing values of the PRF keys and ensures contributiveness for the intermediate value ρ n , which is then used as a seed for f to derive the key confirmation token µ (on input a constant public value v 1 ) and the actual session group key K (on input another constant public value v 2 = v 1 ). Prior to accepting K: (i) participants exchange and verify signatures on µ to ensure MA-security (similar to [20] ) and (ii) erase [17] all ephemeral secrets, used to obtain K from their internal states, to achieve strong AKE-security. 
Detailed Description of TDH1
Preliminary Notations
We assume that long-lived keys LL i = (sk i , pk i ) are generated via Σ.Gen(1 κ ), where Σ = (Gen, Sign, Verify) is an existentially unforgeable (under chosen message attacks) digital signature scheme. We define the following key exchange functions: 
Let F := f k k∈{0,1} κ κ∈N be a collision-resistant pseudorandom function ensemble with domain and range {0, 1} κ (see [20] for definition). 
The Protocol TDH1.Setup
In the following we assume that an oracle aborts without accepting if any performed check fails. Round 1. Given the tree structure Tn, each oracle Π i proceeds as follows:
• Pick at random nonce r i ∈R {0, 1} κ ;
• Invoke TDH1 Pick(1 κ ) to generate a secret exponent
• Invoke Σ.Sign to obtain a signature σi on 0|y l i ,v i |r i | pid i using the private key sk i ;
Round 2. Each oracle Π i proceeds as follows:
In addition, Π 1 does the following:
• Invoke Σ.Sign to obtain a signature σ 1 on 1|Ŷ |sid1| pid 1 using the private key sk1;
• Broadcast U 1 |1|Ŷ |σ 1 .
Round 3. Each Π i with i > 1 proceeds as follows:
• Check if Σ.Verify(pk 1 , 1|Ŷ |sid i |pid i , σ 1 ) = 1;
Then every oracle (including Π 1 ) does the following:
• Compute both K i and µ i using TDH1 Con(
• Erase any private information from state i (including all x l,v , and ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n ) except for K i ;
• Invoke Σ.Sign to obtain a signature σ i on 2|µi|sidi| pid i using the private key sk i ;
Group Key Computation. When Π i receives U j |2|σ j from all other oracles, it proceeds as follows:
• Erase any private information from state i (including K i ), and accept with K i . (1, 1, x 1,1 , y 1 
Broadcast round: Every Π i broadcasts Ui|2|σ i x 1,1 . Hence, every oracle is in possession of x 0,0 . Finally, all three oracles can compute the intermediate value K , i.e., ρ0 := fx 0,0 κ (v0), ρ1 := f ρ 0 ⊕π(r 1 ) (v0), ρ2 := f ρ 1 ⊕π(r 2 ) (v0), and K = ρ 3 := f ρ 2 ⊕π(r 2 ) (v 0 ), and the key confirmation token µ := f K (v 1 ). Note that the value x 0,0 is never sent over the public channel but computed locally by all participants upon receiving enough information. Furthermore, there exists no y 0,0 in the protocol.
Security and Performance of TDH1
In our security proofs following the specification of our model we consider that ephemeral secret information kept in state U is always independent of the long-lived key skU . That is, in each session, state U contains X U consisting of all secrets x l,v known to Π U , ρ 0 , . . . , ρ n and possibly some (implementation specific) temporary variables used to compute these values. Furthermore, we assume that the signing algorithm Σ.Sign which implicitly uses skU is executed under the same protection mechanism as sk U , e.g., in a smart card as in [9] (although smart cards have limited resources we observe that in TDH1.Setup each oracle has to generate at most three signatures). This is important since the signing algorithm may generate some randomness which should also be protected from being revealed via a RevealState query; otherwise the adversary may be able to obtain some information about sk U .
The following theorems show that TDH1 satisfies the requirements of strong AKE-, MA-security and contributiveness; the last two also under consideration of insider attacks. In all theorems qs is the total number of executed protocol sessions during the corresponding attack game.
Strong AKE-Security of TDH1
Theorem 2. If Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks, F is pseudo-random, and G is TDDHhard then TDH1 provides strong AKE-security, and
We define a sequence of games G i , i = 0, . . . , 7 with the adversary A against the AKE-security of TDH1. In each game we denote Win ake i the event that the bit b output by A is identical to the randomly chosen bit b in game G i .
Game G0. This game is the real game Game
A,TDH1 (κ) where we use a simulator ∆ to simulate the execution of the protocol and answer all queries of A.
Game G 1 . This game is identical to Game G 0 with the only exception that ∆ fails and bit b is set at random if A asks a Send query on some Ui|seqn|m|σ, with seqn ∈ {0, 1, 2} and σ a valid signature on m, that has not been previously output by an oracle Π s i before querying Corrupt(U i ) (note that Corrupt queries can be generally asked after the Test query).
In other words the simulation fails if A outputs a successful forgery; such event is denoted Forge. A classical reductionist argument (see for instance [11] ) shows that in that case we can build a forger against the signature scheme and upper-bound the probability difference between G 1 and G 0 by N Succ euf−cma Σ (κ). Game G2. This game is identical to Game G1 except that ∆ fails if two instances of an honest user used the same nonce twice. Since there are N users and at most q s sessions the difference between games can be upper-bounded by ( Game G 4 . This game is identical to Game G 3 except that ∆ is given a tuple from the real TDDH T N distribution (as specified in Section 3.1.2) where T N is a linear tree. In all sessions except the q * s -th one, ∆ simulates the honest participants as specified by the protocol. In the q * s -th session with n participants ∆ injects public values g x l,v from TDDH T N into the protocol execution. Note that in the q * s -th session the group size n might be smaller than N , thus the simulator will use the subtree Tn which is composed of TN 's nodes from level 0 to level n − 1. The idea is to assign Π RevealState queries can be easily answered. Since TDDH T N is a real distribution we conclude that this game is a "bridging step" (as named in [32] ) and Pr[Win ]. Game G5. This game is identical to Game G4 except that ∆ is given a tuple from the random TDDH
Game G 6 . This game is identical to Game G 5 except that in the q * s -th session ∆ replaces f by a truly random function, implying the uniform distribution of K = ρn. Considering n ≤ N we obtain by a "hybrid argument"
Game G7. This is the continuation of the hybrid argument, but for clarity we specify a separate game; the confirmation token µ and the session key K are replaced by two random κ-bit values, s.t., | Pr[Win 
Strong MA-Security of TDH1
Theorem 3. If Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks and F is collision-resistant then TDH1 5 More precisely, one constructs n + 1 auxiliary "hybrid games" G 6 ,l , l = 0, . . . , n and replaces in each game ρ l by a random value from {0, 1} κ . The difference between two neighbor hybrids is upper-bounded by the PRF advantage.
provides strong MA-security, and 
However the validity of signatures on tokens µi and µj imply that µi = µj. Thus the probability difference between these games is upperbounded by q s Pr[K
and results in q s Succ coll F (κ). Combining the previous equations we get the desired result.
Strong Contributiveness of TDH1
Theorem 4. If π is one-way and F is collision-resistant pseudo-random then TDH1 provides strong contributiveness, and
In our proof we show that despite of being able to enforce x 0,0 (see the full paper for a detailed discussion) the adversary is still unable to enforce the resulting session group key K. We make use of the following "difference lemma". With this lemma we can define sequence games based on condition events. In game G i+1 constructed from G i w.r.t. some appropriate condition event C the event Wini+1 is defined as Wini|C. Then according to Lemma 
κ . Game G3. In this game we consider a condition event that A (being in the prepare stage) is NOT able to output K s i * := ρ n computed by Π s i * in any session of the attack stage. Evaluating probabilities that ρ n , ρ n−1 , . . . can be predicted is done via a hybrid argument. In a nutshell, either the adversary can find the same output with a different key (which breaks collision-resistance) or he influences the PRF key ρ i−1 ⊕π(r i ): this can be done either by inverting π or by a random guess. According to Lemma 1 we finally obtain: Pr[Win
6 Note, in G 0 and G 1 the adversary only outputs a value for the resulting group key. In G2 we consider the additional (in)ability of the adversary to output the value for ρ i * . Since we are only interested in the success probability of A under this condition ∆ does not need to detect whether A is able to output the correct value or not. The same considerations are applicable to G 3 w.r. 
Comparison of Security and Performance of TDH1 and Further GKE Protocols
In Table 1 we compare TDH1 protocol with several wellknown provably secure GKE protocols in terms of their performance and security goals.
Our comparison is done based on the security arguments and adversarial settings given in the original publications (sometimes transformed to the terminology of our model). In general, "weak" (or "strong") denotes consideration of weak (or strong) corruptions for each of the security requirements, whereas "honest" (or "malicious") denotes the assumption on the type of the protocol participants. Note again that by strong corruptions we mean not only adaptive attacks revealing the long-lived key (thus, weak corruptions) but also opening attacks which read out the ephemeral secrets. We also distinguish whether a protocol has been proven under standard or non-standard assumptions such as Ideal Cipher Model (ICM) or Random Oracle Model (ROM). We remark that TDH1 is the only protocol which provably satisfies strong versions of AKE-, MA-security and contributiveness (under consideration of malicious insiders where appropriate, that is for MA and contributiveness) while being proven in the standard model. The protocol proposed by Desmedt et al. [18] has similar properties as TDH1 but deals only with weak corruptions (ephemeral secrets never leak). The work by Katz and Shin 8 [20] can also be seen as close to ours since they provide MA-security against malicious insiders; the difference is that [20] (although considering strong corruptions) does not allow separate opening attacks: the scenario in which adversary learns the ephemeral secrets of other honest users is not considered. Additionally, we note that the overall efficiency of TDH1 is similar to the most efficient currently known provably secure GKE protocols (in the standard model).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have addressed security of GKE protocols against strong (adaptive) corruptions which reveal ephemeral secrets of participants and proposed appropriate definitions of strong AKE-, MA-security, and contributiveness. Additionally, we presented a three-round GKE protocol TDH1 which satisfies strong security under standard cryptographic assumptions.
We observe that the function TDH1 Con(x 0,0 , r 1 | . . . |r n ) is of independent interest since it can be seen as an addon compiler for our definition of contributiveness if x 0,0 is the common ephemeral secret computed in the underlying GKE protocol. Since many GKE protocols require users to generate random nonces (e.g. for building session ids as in [21] ), achieving contributiveness in such protocols does not require any additional communication. The equivalence between the TDDH and DDH assumptions is also of independent interest since it is valuable for the construction of other cryptographic schemes with provable security in the standard model. An interesting question is still whether TDDH is randomly self-reducible?
Beside the extension of TDH1 towards dynamic groups, general future work in the area of GKE security might address: consideration of strong corruptions in combination with fault-tolerance and security against DoS attacks discussed in [14] and [18] ; and strengthening of the simulationbased security models for GKE protocols (e.g. [20] ) towards opening attacks due to our Remark 1.
